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SYMPOSIUM 
Cyberwar, International Politics, and 
Institutional Design 
Daniel Abebe† 
In the United States, the breadth of the president’s warmaking authority has 
been governed by the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and, over 
time, historical practice; in short, the president’s powers are constrained by a well-
developed body of US foreign relations law. But the prospect of a new kind of con-
flict—cyberwar—potentially challenges the existing regulatory regime, which rests 
on assumptions that are common to traditional, conventional war. For some, the 
complexities of cyberwar generate new foreign relations–law questions about the 
president’s authority to engage in offensive cyberoperations, and they thus necessi-
tate a new regulatory framework. For others, cyberwar is not meaningfully differ-
ent from traditional war for purposes of foreign relations law, and the extant re-
gime regulating the president is sufficient. As it currently stands, the debate about 
the scope of the president’s cyberwar authority turns on arguments about 
cyberwar’s similarity or dissimilarity to conventional war. 
This Essay argues that any claim about regulating the president’s authority 
to engage in cyberwar requires consideration of the United States’ cyberstrategy 
and the capacity and national interests of the United States’ cybercompetitors. For 
the United States to achieve its foreign policy goals in cyberspace, the president 
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must navigate both the internal constraints from domestic law and the external 
constraints from international politics. Building on previous work, the Essay pro-
vides two models with which to understand internal and external constraints and 
their consequences on any potential cyberwar regulation. It contends that a frame-
work that does not consider the complex relationship between the two types of con-
straints might result in a regulatory regime that leaves the president overcon-
strained and unable to achieve US cyberpolicy goals. 
INTRODUCTION 
US foreign affairs law regulates the president’s warmaking 
authority. The Constitution, the Supreme Court’s foreign affairs 
precedent, statutory restrictions, and historical practice, consid-
ered together and sometimes accompanied by functional consid-
erations, create the judicial and legislative regimes regulating 
the president. Consideration of these factors will, so the conven-
tional wisdom goes, produce the constitutionally required level 
of oversight over the president’s warmaking activities. In short, 
the focus is on exclusively domestic, internal constraints on the 
president. For many, the story stops here. 
But this does not get us very far. The conventional wisdom 
ignores the impact of external constraints on the president as he 
pursues US foreign policy objectives. In a series of articles,1 I 
have argued that to determine the appropriate level of regula-
tion of the president, we need to not only consider the foreign 
policy goals of the United States but also understand the nature 
of the international political environment. Most important, we 
must consider the external constraints that are created by the 
competing foreign policy goals and strategic interests of poten-
tial adversaries. Although the Constitution’s text, theories of sep-
aration of powers, and institutional competencies are certainly 
relevant to the analysis, they provide insufficient guidance by 
themselves. Rather, if we want the president to achieve the 
United States’ foreign policy objectives—whatever they may 
 
 1 See generally Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs 
Law, 49 Stan J Intl L 1 (2013) (developing a theory of internal and external constraints 
and a framework with which to understand the impact of international political varia-
bles on the president’s foreign affairs authority); Daniel Abebe, Rethinking the Costs of 
International Delegations, 34 U Pa J Intl L 491 (2013) (arguing that the United States’ 
influence on the operation of international organizations makes delegations of authority 
less costly than originally assumed); Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political 
Question Doctrine and Acoustic Dissonance in Foreign Affairs, 2012 S Ct Rev 233 (argu-
ing that the one-voice presumption between Congress and the president should vary 
based on international political variables). 
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be—we need to know something about the external constraints 
on the United States in international politics to better calibrate 
the level of internal constraints on the president. 
This key insight is no less salient in the context of regulat-
ing the president’s cyberwarmaking authority. Recently, the 
Obama administration formally outlined the United States’ 
Cyber Strategy and, for the first time, described the conditions 
under which the United States would engage in cyberwarfare.2 
Although the Cyber Strategy declares that the United States, 
through the president, will comply with international and do-
mestic law, it still contemplates the possibility of cyberwarfare 
and cyberwarmaking by the president, perhaps even in the ab-
sence of specific legislative authorization.3 The potential for 
cyberoperations and cyberwar generates an interesting set of 
questions about the suitability of the traditional foreign affairs 
understanding of war for a new, technologically complex type of 
warfare. Is the conventional model perfectly appropriate for the 
cybercontext? Is new regulation necessary? If so, in what form? 
In this Essay, I try to make progress in answering these 
questions. I argue that the strength of external constraints on 
the United States in the cyberwar context should affect the way 
we think about the level of internal constraints (cyberregulation) 
on the president. The normative claim is that as the external 
constraints on the United States strengthen, the internal con-
straints on the president should weaken, and that as the exter-
nal constraints on the United States weaken, the internal con-
straints on the president should strengthen. The overall level of 
constraint on the president is the sum of external and internal 
constraints, and determining the right level of cyberregulation 
requires consideration of the dynamic relationship between the 
two. Failure to appreciate this might result in overconstraint, 
leaving the president unable to achieve US cyberpolicy goals, or in 
 
 2 The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy *5 (Department of Defense, Apr 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/T7UH-NM3S (noting that, under the direction of the presi-
dent or secretary of defense, “the U.S. military may conduct cyber operations to counter 
an imminent or on-going attack against the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests in cyber-
space” or “to disrupt an adversary’s military-related networks or infrastructure so that 
the U.S. military can protect U.S. interests in an area of operations”). 
 3 Id (specifying that defensive action may be taken in response to cyberattacks re-
sulting in “loss of life, significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy 
consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States,” but qualifying that 
cyberattacks are to be “assessed on a case-by-case and fact-specific basis by the President 
and the U.S. national security team”). 
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underconstraint, allowing the president to act without sufficient 
oversight and potentially creating costs for the United States. 
Consideration and categorization of all possible external 
constraints is certainly well beyond the scope of this Symposium 
contribution. However, a short list of external constraints in-
cludes: international law; the cybercapacity, strategic interests, 
and foreign policy goals of our potential cyberadversaries, in-
cluding China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and various nonstate 
actors; and the vast array of private sector military, software, 
and technology companies involved in cybersecurity issues,4 
among other constraints. Although an exhaustive analysis is 
impossible here,5 the Essay takes an initial step in considering 
the range of external constraints on the United States by exam-
ining the cybercapacity and strategic interests of China and 
Russia, with the goal of better understanding the nature of exter-
nal constraints on the United States. Part I discusses the US re-
gime for regulating the president’s foreign affairs authority and 
the international law rules regulating a state’s use of force. Part 
II applies my framework of internal and external constraints to 
the cyberwar context and provides some tentative thoughts on the 
merits of domestic and international cyberregulation. 
I.  US FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND 
CYBERWAR 
International law defines, specifies, and regulates the nar-
row conditions under which a state can use force against anoth-
er state. Similarly, the constitutional law of US foreign affairs 
regulates the way that the United States engages in hostilities, 
and it divides US warmaking authority between Congress and 
 
 4 Professor Ashley Deeks provides a very helpful discussion of the external intelli-
gence and national-security constraints on the president in her Symposium contribution. 
See generally Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U Chi L Rev 65 
(2016) (discussing the role of foreign intelligence services and corporations in potentially 
constraining the president in the cybercontext). 
 5 For a comprehensive analysis of the national-security issues related to cyber-
space, cyberwar, and cyberstrategy, see generally Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The 
Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (Norton 2015); Richard A. 
Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What 
to Do about It (Ecco 2010); Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz, 
eds, Cyberpower and National Security (Potomac 2009). For purposes of this Essay, 
cyberattacks are “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy com-
puter systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting 
these systems or networks.” P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and 
Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know 68 (Oxford 2014). 
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the president. Together, both bodies of law shape the legal regu-
latory framework for the use of force by the United States. What 
remains unclear, however, is the suitability of this framework, 
drawn from the conventional-war context, for the potential chal-
lenges that cyberwarfare presents. In short, is new legal regula-
tion, whether by statute or treaty, necessary? To make progress 
on this core question, the sections below briefly describe the cur-
rent regime. 
A. International Law and Cyberwar 
The UN Charter, in Article 2(4), restricts the circumstances 
under which a state may use force or the threat of force against 
another state.6 Article 2(4) works in conjunction with Article 51 
of the Charter, which provides a narrow exception for the use of 
force in self-defense in the event of an “armed attack.”7 To illus-
trate the interaction of these two articles, an offensive cyber-
attack by State A on State B might violate the “use of force” 
prohibition in Article 2(4) and, if so, could serve as the basis for 
State B to exercise its right to self-defense8 if the cyberattack con-
stituted an “armed attack” under Article 51.9 Finally, the UN Se-
curity Council, under Articles 39, 41, and 42 of the Charter,10 may 
permit the use of cyberwar as part of the “measures” or “action[s] 
 
 6 UN Charter Art 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”). 
 7 UN Charter Art 51: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the Unit-
ed Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Secu-
rity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of 
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action 
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. 
 8 A further question is whether State B may use military force in response to a 
cyberattack. 
 9 For thoughtful discussion of these issues in the cybercontext, see generally Oona 
A. Hathaway, et al, The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 Cal L Rev 817 (2012); Matthew C. 
Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 Yale J 
Intl L 421 (2011). 
 10 UN Charter Arts 39, 41–42. 
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. . . necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”11 
The United States has taken the position that cyberattacks 
may trigger both Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the Charter under 
certain circumstances. Specifically, “cyber activities that proxi-
mately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would 
likely be viewed as a use of force” under Article 2(4) and trigger 
a “national right of self-defense” under Article 51.12 If a state in-
vokes Article 51, the core principles of the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC)—jus in bello or international humanitarian law, includ-
ing the requirements of proportionality, military necessity, dis-
tinction, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering—proscribe 
the exercise of self-defense.13 Such prohibitions would presuma-
bly apply to any self-defense measures taken in response to a 
cyberattack, just as they do with respect to conventional war-
fare. Despite the United States’ position that the Charter and 
LOAC apply to cyberattacks, the international legal framework 
regulating the use of force unsurprisingly corresponds to a more 
traditional conception of war. At times, the framework is incon-
gruous with the technological complexity of cyberwarfare. 
For example, in cyberspace it is unclear what constitutes a 
weapon, an act of war, or the use of force necessary to trigger 
UN Charter protections. Perhaps more importantly, the problem 
of attribution—necessary for a state’s invocation of Article 51’s 
self-defense provisions—is exceedingly difficult in cyberspace, or 
at least much more so than in traditional military conflicts.14 
Further, under international humanitarian law, the principles of 
proportionality and the distinction between military and nonmili-
tary targets are harder to apply in the cyberwar context, especial-
ly if states choose to respond to cyberattacks with conventional 
 
 11 UN Charter Art 42. 
 12 Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 Harv Intl L J Online 1, 
4 (2012) (emphasis omitted) (providing examples of Article 2(4) violations, including 
“(1) operations that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown, (2) operations that open a dam 
above a populated area causing destruction, or (3) operations that disable air traffic con-
trol resulting in airplane crashes”). 
 13 For a summary of these jus in bello limitations and a discussion of their applica-
tion in the context of cyberattacks, see Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of 
War, 30 Berkeley J Intl L 525, 562–75 (2012). 
 14 See Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for Oper-
ating in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 AF L Rev 167, 193 (2012) (“Given 
the inherent anonymity of the technology involved, attribution of a cyber attack can be 
time-consuming and [it can be] difficult to conclusively identify the entity initiating or 
directing the attack.”). 
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military force (or to counter military force with cyber-
operations).15 Cyberattacks on the military infrastructure of tele-
communications networks in cyberspace might have severe con-
sequences on civilian networks, further complicating 
assessments of proportionality and distinction even for states 
making good faith efforts to comply with international humani-
tarian law.16 Finally, in the absence of an international cyber-
space treaty17 to define the relevant terms, many of the technical 
questions regarding the fit between the Charter and interna-
tional humanitarian law on one hand, and the complexity of 
cyberwar on the other, remain unanswered. 
B. US Law and Cyberwar 
As the Section below discusses, the possibility of cyberwar 
generates a number of complicated foreign relations–law ques-
tions regarding the extent of the president’s independent au-
thority to engage in cyberwarfare. Such questions have become 
increasingly important as the Obama administration begins to 
outline the United States’ approach to cyberoperations and the 
breadth of the president’s authority to carry out cyberattacks. 
For example, in mid-April 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton 
Carter announced the United States’ Cyber Strategy, which 
states that the United States will use cyberwarfare as a part of 
offensive military operations, in retaliation for cyberattacks, and 
as part of covert actions against potential state threats. The 
Cyber Strategy specifically describes China, Russia, North Korea, 
and Iran as “[k]ey [c]yber [t]hreats” and “[p]otential adversaries,”18 
 
 15 See Gervais, 30 Berkeley J Intl L at 565–69 (cited in note 13) (“The international 
humanitarian law definition of combatant is an awkward fit for cyberspace.”). See also id 
at 571–73 (noting that “[t]he proportionality analysis of a cyber attack must always be 
considered on a case-by-case basis” and describing the difficulty in determining “whether 
a cyber attack can meet the necessary requirements to be considered lawful”). 
 16 See Ruth G. Wedgwood, Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War, in Michael 
N. Schmitt and Brian T. O’Donnell, eds, Computer Network Attack and International 
Law 219, 227–28 (Naval War College 1999). See also Gervais, 30 Berkeley J Intl L at 
568–69 (cited in note 13) (“A harder determination to make is whether it is unlawful to 
attack dual-use objects that serve both civilian and military purposes.”); Sheng Li, Note, 
When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, 38 Yale J Intl L 
179, 209 (2013) (arguing that proportionality “may favor [ ] targeting enabling infra-
structure” as a good faith defensive response to a cyberattack and using the case of the 
2007 cyberattacks against Estonia as an illustration). 
 17 For a discussion about the obstacles to reaching an international cybertreaty, see 
generally Michael J. Glennon, The Dark Future of International Cybersecurity Regula-
tion, 6 J Natl Sec L & Pol 563 (2013). 
 18 The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy at *9 (cited in note 2). 
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and it pledges that the United States will engage in cyber-
operations “[i]n a manner consistent with [American] and inter-
national law . . . to deter attacks and defend the United States 
against any adversary.”19 Finally, it suggests that the United 
States might, under certain circumstances, engage in preemp-
tive cyberoperations: “[T]he United States military might use 
cyber operations to terminate an ongoing conflict on U.S. terms, 
or to disrupt an adversary’s military systems to prevent the use of 
force against U.S. interests.”20 Most relevant here, the Cyber 
Strategy neither specifically identifies the precise legal basis for 
the president to engage in offensive cyberoperations without 
specific authorization from Congress, nor clearly suggests that 
the existing constitutional and statutory framework already 
provides such authority. 
1. US war powers. 
Very briefly, the Constitution provides the basic structure 
for understanding the national government’s foreign affairs and 
warmaking authority. Congress is formally assigned the bulk of 
the foreign affairs authority in Article I; most salient for our 
purposes are the powers to declare war,21 raise and support an 
army,22 and regulate the armed forces.23 In contrast, the presi-
dent has a narrower grant of authority related to war, specifically 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause in Article II.24 Moreover, Con-
gress can limit—and has limited—the president’s warmaking 
power at times through the use of its appropriations authority25 
 
 19 Id at *2. 
 20 Id at *5 (emphasis added). 
 21 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11. 
 22 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 12. 
 23 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 14. 
 24 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1. 
 25 During the Vietnam War, Congress restricted President Richard Nixon’s expan-
sion of the war to Cambodia by denying funds for the introduction of ground-combat 
troops. See Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 § 7(a), Pub L No 91-652, 84 Stat 1942, 
1943. Similarly, Congress attempted to constrain the president and limit US involve-
ment with the contras. See, for example, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1984 § 108, Pub L No 98-215, 97 Stat 1473, 1475 (limiting funding for the contras from 
any source to $24 million). 
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and through foreign affairs legislation,26 most prominently the 
War Powers Resolution.27 
Despite the limited number of enumerated grants in Arti-
cle II, the president is generally considered the leading actor in 
foreign affairs28 and plays the primary role in developing US for-
eign policy.29 The Supreme Court’s broad interpretations of Arti-
cle II,30 the accumulated historical practice in foreign affairs,31 
the perceived congressional acquiescence to the executive,32 and 
the functional advantages of the executive33 have all contributed 
to the president’s dominant position in foreign affairs. 
Although some of the president’s authority in foreign affairs 
stems from Congress’s broad statutory delegations of power,34 
 
 26 See, for example, War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-192, 110 Stat 2104, cod-
ified as amended at 18 USC § 2441; Little v Barreme, 6 US (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804) 
(holding that the president cannot ignore congressional restrictions on the capture of 
vessels during war). 
 27 Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), codified as amended at 50 USC § 1541 et 
seq (limiting the president’s ability to commit the United States to war without prior 
congressional authorization and requiring the president to disclose his activities to Con-
gress, among other restrictions). 
 28 See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: 
After the Madisonian Republic 174 (Oxford 2010) (“Executives have always had the leading 
role in foreign affairs because of the fast-changing nature of international relations and the 
importance of secrecy and unity.”); Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing 
Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1170, 1202 (2007) (“Courts sometimes say that the 
executive has the primary foreign relations power.”); Harold Hongju Koh, The National 
Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair 69 (Yale 1990) (noting 
disapprovingly that, “[a]s it has evolved, the National Security Constitution assigns to 
the president the predominant role” in the process of making and validating foreign poli-
cy decisions). 
 29 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Ma-
terials 175 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed 2014) (“In practice, the Executive Branch exercises a 
virtual monopoly over formal communications with foreign nations and also plays a lead 
role in announcing U.S. foreign policy.”). 
 30 See, for example, United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304, 319 
(1936) (“The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with re-
gard to foreign nations.”). 
 31 See Posner and Sunstein, 116 Yale L J at 1202 (cited in note 28) (“[T]he underly-
ing justifications [for deference to the executive in foreign relations] are often less textu-
al than functional, based on traditional practices and understandings.”). 
 32 See Derek Jinks and Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 
116 Yale L J 1230, 1234 (2007) (noting “the trend of [the executive] circumventing Con-
gress in key decisions involving war powers”). 
 33 See Posner and Sunstein, 116 Yale L J at 1202 (cited in note 28) (“[T]he execu-
tive has expertise and flexibility, can keep secrets, can efficiently monitor developments, 
and can act quickly and decisively; the other branches cannot.”). 
 34 See, for example, Act of Dec 28, 1977 §§ 201–08 (“International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act”), Pub L No 95-223, 91 Stat 1625, 1626–29, codified as amended at 50 
USC §§ 1701–06 (granting the president the power to “investigate, regulate, direct and 
compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, 
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the president has historically exercised some independent au-
thority in the warmaking context. Both Durand v Hollins35 and 
the Prize Cases36 stand for the proposition that the president has 
the independent authority both to protect US citizens and prop-
erty abroad37 and to repel attacks and invasions.38 Much more 
recently, Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama arguably 
engaged in offensive uses of force during the 1999 Kosovo bomb-
ing campaign and the 2011 Libya intervention, respectively, 
without complying with the specific congressional-authorization 
requirement in the War Powers Resolution.39 Finally, while 
there is a general consensus that congressional authorization is 
required for the United States to go to war (understood as a 
long-term engagement in offensive military activities),40 once 
hostilities have commenced, the Commander-in-Chief Clause 
provides the president with formal authority over the conduct of 
hostilities. Against this backdrop of presidential warmaking au-
thority, the salient question is whether cyberoperations and 
cyberwar are sufficiently distinct from conventional military op-
erations and war to justify revision of the existing legal frame-
work governing the president’s power in this arena. 
2. Conventional war and cyberwar. 
We can imagine several different perspectives on this ques-
tion, ranging from the claim that cyberwar is no different than 
traditional war for purposes of the president’s warmaking author-
ity, to the claim that cyberwar could be so damaging that it war-
rants greater scrutiny of the president’s activities. For example, 
 
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation” of foreign property, 
among other powers). 
 35 8 F Cases 111 (CC SDNY 1860). 
 36 67 US (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
 37 Durand, 8 F Cases at 112 (holding that the president has the inherent authority 
to protect Americans abroad). 
 38 Prize Cases, 67 US (2 Black) at 666 (holding that the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause provided President Abraham Lincoln with the necessary authority to initiate a 
blockade during the Civil War). 
 39 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Pow-
ers Resolution, 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 1149, 1154 (2001) (“Operation Allied Force . . . con-
tinue[d] beyond sixty days without express statutory authorization, in apparent contra-
vention of the War Powers Resolution.”); Judah A. Druck, Note, Droning On: The War 
Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare, 98 Cornell L 
Rev 209, 210 (2012) (noting that Obama “stood firmly behind his decision to intervene in 
Libya without consulting Congress”). 
 40 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and 
the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv L Rev 2047, 2057 (2005). 
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one view is that cyberwarfare is potentially more catastrophic, 
secretive, and dynamic than conventional warfare and that it 
consequently requires more oversight. Cyberwarfare has the 
unique capacity to generate “enormous consequences for the se-
curity and other interests of the United States,”41 which may 
justify a greater role for Congress in formulating cyberpolicy.42 
A similar view suggests that the United States should regu-
late cyberoperations under the covert action statute,43 which 
formally defines the scope of permissible US covert actions, es-
tablishes a strict approval process for the president, and creates 
a reporting regime to ensure that Congress is regularly informed 
of any covert actions.44 The statute is preferable to the legal 
framework for military action because “[c]yberattacks’ key at-
tributes—remote access, unpredictable effects, and difficulty of 
attribution—can result in fundamentally different legal prob-
lems than conventional weapons attacks.”45 Some worry that the 
statute, however, excludes “traditional . . . military activities or 
routine support to such activities”46 from the definition of covert 
action, meaning that the president could classify offensive 
cyberoperations as traditional military activities and avoid con-
gressional oversight.47 Other proposals include measures that 
“would direct the President to keep Congress fully informed about 
anticipated and actual uses of cyber weapons” and that “would 
restrict potential executive branch actions that seem—as a mat-
ter of policy—particularly unwise.”48 Though these perspectives 
 
 41 Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J Natl Sec L & Pol 155, 
162 (2010). 
 42 Id at 162–64. 
 43 Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991 § 602(a)(2), Pub L No 102-88, 
105 Stat 429, 442–44, codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 3091–93. 
 44 For a more detailed discussion of the covert action statute, see William J. 
Daugherty, Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs since Reagan, 17 Intl J In-
tell & Counterintell 62, 66–67 (2004). See also generally W. Michael Reisman and James 
E. Baker, Regulating Covert Action: Practices, Contexts, and Policies of Covert Coercion 
Abroad in International and American Law (Yale 1992). 
 45 Aaron P. Brecher, Note, Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: Toward a 
Domestic Legal Framework for Offensive Cyberoperations, 111 Mich L Rev 423, 430 
(2012). The Obama administration’s Cyber Strategy moves away from a covert action 
model. See David E. Sanger, Pentagon Announces New Strategy for Cyberwarfare (NY 
Times, Apr 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CF2N-C32X. 
 46 50 USC § 3093(e)(2). 
 47 See, for example, Dycus, 4 J Natl Sec L & Pol at 161–62 (cited in note 41); 
Brecher, Note, 111 Mich L Rev at 435–36 (cited in note 45). 
 48 Dycus, 4 J Natl Sec L & Pol at 167 (cited in note 41). For more discussion of offen-
sive cyberoperations, see generally Eric Lorber, Comment, Executive Warmaking Authority 
 12  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1 
   
by no means reflect the full range of potential policy proposals 
for the regulation of cyberwar and cyberoperations, they are 
consistent in structure with the recurring debate about the 
proper balance between the president and Congress in foreign 
affairs—that is, between providing the president with sufficient 
flexibility to address national-security issues and ensuring that 
Congress can meaningfully exercise its oversight function. 
At this stage, it becomes clear that the rapidly evolving cyber-
regulation debate is incomplete. By focusing exclusively on inter-
nal factors, the debate leaves out the external variables that shape 
the president’s options in achieving the United States’ cyberpolicy 
goals, whatever they may be. More concretely, this Essay argues 
that we cannot determine the proper level of cyberregulation—
or even determine whether new regulation is necessary—
without at the very least considering the United States’ cyberca-
pacity relative to other states, both today and over time; the 
strategic interests and the level of internal cyberregulation of 
potential adversaries; and the prospects for and the likely effica-
cy of international cyberregulation, among other factors. In oth-
er words, US cyberregulation, in whatever form, must consider 
not only the domestic constitutional and statutory issues relat-
ing to congressional oversight of the president (internal con-
straints) but also the international factors that limit the United 
States’ cyberwarfare capacity (external constraints). 
In Part II, I discuss my general framework for considering 
internal and external constraints and apply it to the cyber-
regulation context. 
II.  STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND CYBERWAR REGULATION 
Scholars might examine the relevant legal authorities and 
conclude that the constitutionally required level of cyberwar regu-
lation permits the president to independently exercise the United 
States’ defensive cyberwar capabilities, but that it mandates spe-
cific authorization from Congress for any preemptive or offensive 
cyberoperations.49 It might be argued that such a cyberregime is 
 
and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presiden-
tial Power?, 15 U Pa J Const L 961 (2013). 
 49 See Bradley and Goldsmith, 118 Harv L Rev at 2057 (cited in note 40) (noting 
that “[m]any war powers scholars argue that the President is constitutionally required to 
obtain some form of congressional authorization before initiating significant offensive 
military operations,” but also noting that these scholars “do not typically argue that 
Congress’s authorization must take the form of a formal declaration of war”). 
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consistent with separation of powers in that it not only captures 
the president’s need for flexibility in defending the United 
States but also ensures that Congress can exercise oversight ca-
pacity, shape cyberpolicy, and prevent potential abuse. Though 
this regime might satisfy constitutional prerequisites for strik-
ing a balance between flexibility and oversight in cyberregula-
tion, there is no reason to believe that the regime provides the 
president with the necessary latitude to pursue the United 
States’ strategic interests in international politics. I argue that 
this regime is unlikely to produce cyberregulation that is tai-
lored to the United States’ cyberpolicy needs, because it does not 
consider the relationship between the president’s pursuit of US 
interests and the external constraints on the United States im-
posed by its potential adversaries—China and Russia. 
A. A Framework for Cyberregulation and Institutional Design 
At issue here is determining the proper level of regulation of 
the president’s exercise of offensive cyberwarmaking authority. 
For guidance, we can look to the Constitution, Congress’s foreign 
affairs–related statutes, and historical practice, and we can fur-
ther consider the relative competencies and incentives of the 
president and Congress. After evaluating all of these factors, we 
might conclude that a particular form of regulation is legally re-
quired. But in arriving at this conclusion, we are looking solely 
at domestic, internal sources of law to establish the appropriate 
level of cyberregulation. 
With that in mind, it is unlikely that a narrow examination 
of domestic variables will produce a cyberregulatory regime that 
permits the United States to achieve its cyber-related foreign 
policy goals. Whatever the United States’ strategic objectives 
(this Essay is agnostic on what they should be), the main pur-
pose of any cyberregulatory regime is to provide the president 
with the necessary latitude to achieve US interests, while allow-
ing congressional oversight to prevent the president from adopt-
ing policies that impose costs on the United States. Of course, 
we should start the analysis by considering the Constitution, 
statutes, and precedent, but we must also understand the exter-
nal environment in which the United States pursues its foreign 
policy goals. Most importantly, we need to evaluate the obstacles, 
adversaries, and constraints that the United States, through the 
president, faces in realizing its cyberstrategy objectives. 
 14  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1 
   
For example, let’s assume that the United States is the 
world’s predominant cyberpower. Call this Model One. In this 
model, the United States possesses the most-advanced offensive-
cyberwarfare capacity and also maintains formidable cyber-
defenses. In short, the United States is the sole “cyber-
superpower” and, acting through the president, is well-placed to 
pursue and achieve its cyberpolicy goals. And since potential ad-
versaries like China and Russia cannot compete with the United 
States’ cybercapacity, the external constraints on the president 
(and the United States) from international politics are weak. In 
this stylized example, the president is free from external politi-
cal constraints and is limited by only internal legal constraints. 
In contrast, let’s assume that the United States is one of 
three evenly matched world cyberpowers, including China and 
Russia, with other states like North Korea and Iran rapidly im-
proving their cybercapacities. Call this Model Two. In this mod-
el, the United States, China, and Russia are aggressively com-
peting for cyberdominance and have the capacity to engage in 
offensive cyberoperations. Here, the United States, through the 
president, will encounter much more significant obstacles in its 
pursuit of the United States’ cyberpolicy goals because it will 
have to contend with powerful adversaries who likely have com-
peting policy objectives. More concretely, China, Russia, North 
Korea, and Iran represent strong external constraints on the 
United States and the president. 
What are the takeaways? First, there is no reason to believe 
that the cyberregulatory regime that is appropriate for Model 
One is also suitable for Model Two. The United States is the sole 
cybersuperpower in Model One but only one of several competing 
cyberpowers in Model Two. Given the variation in the United 
States’ cyberpower in the two models, we must calibrate our in-
ternal cyberregulation in light of the external constraints that 
cabin the president’s pursuit of the United States’ cyberpolicy 
goals. Stated simply, the cyberpower capacities of potential ad-
versaries reflect the strength of external constraints on the 
United States, and any cyberregulation must consider these 
costs, along with the relevant legal authorities, to determine the 
appropriate level and type of cyberregulation. 
Second, whatever you think the optimal level of total re-
straint should be—again, this Essay takes no position on that 
question—the strength of internal constraints on the president 
should vary with the strength of external constraints on the 
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United States. As external constraints on the United States 
strengthen—perhaps an adversary with competing interests be-
comes a cybersuperpower—the internal constraints on the pres-
ident should weaken. Similarly, as external constraints from our 
adversaries weaken, the internal constraints on the president 
should strengthen. Why? A combination of strong internal and 
external constraints might result in overconstraint, leaving the 
president unable to achieve US cyberpolicy goals, while weak in-
ternal and external constraints might result in underconstraint, 
permitting the president to act without sufficient oversight and 
potentially creating costs for the United States.50 
How would this balance work in practice? Ideally, one would 
have a fully developed theory of state behavior in cyberspace51—
akin to international relations theories of state behavior in in-
ternational politics—to identify the cyber-related variables that 
are relevant for assessing the strength of external constraints on 
the United States. Policymakers would then incorporate the re-
sults of this assessment into their calculus in calibrating the 
level of cyberregulation that properly balances the president’s 
need for flexibility in ensuring US national security and Con-
gress’s oversight and monitoring prerogatives. Unfortunately, 
such a theory—and the necessary command of cyber-
technology—is well beyond the scope of this Essay. But we still 
can look to more-traditional measures of state power to provide 
some preliminary guidance in assessing the cyberenvironment. 
The cyberbudgets and cyberincentives of the United States and 
its potential adversaries, to name just two factors, might shed 
light on the nature of the external constraints on the United 
States in international politics. 
1. Cyberwar capacity: the United States, China, and 
Russia. 
Let’s begin by considering the United States’ cyber-
operations capacity relative to potential adversaries. To keep the 
discussion brief, I focus on China and Russia. Of course, the 
analysis here is speculative; neither China nor Russia officially 
 
 50 For a more complete elaboration of this theory, see Abebe, 49 Stan J Intl L at 37–
50 (cited in note 1). 
 51 Stuart H. Starr takes a tentative step in developing such a theory. See generally 
Stuart H. Starr, Toward a Preliminary Theory of Cyberpower, in Kramer, Starr, and 
Wentz, eds, Cyberpower and National Security 43 (cited in note 5) (outlining the author’s 
“initial effort to develop a theory of cyberpower”). 
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(or fully) discloses its cyberoperations potential, and any evalua-
tion of a state’s true cybercapacity requires a strong command of 
the technical aspects of cyberoperations. That said, we can make 
incremental progress by examining publicly available infor-
mation and expert assessments. 
The United States Cyber Command (“CYBERCOM”) is the 
centralized command structure charged with leading US 
cyberoperations.52 As part of the Department of Defense, 
CYBERCOM’s budget totaled some $447 million for the 2014 fis-
cal year53—part of a general “cyberwarfare budget [that] has 
grown from $3.9 billion in 2013 to $4.7 billion in 2014 and an es-
timated $5.1 billion in 2015.”54 CYBERCOM was expected to 
have a staff of six thousand people by 2016,55 divided into one 
hundred teams responsible for “defending military networks, 
damaging the capabilities of enemy networks[,] and helping to 
defend the nation’s infrastructure”56 while also achieving the de-
terrence goals outlined in the Cyber Strategy. The US 
cyberwarfare budget was a small component of the United 
States’ overall military budget of almost $620 billion for fiscal 
year 2014.57 But since the overall size of the US military budget 
far exceeds the budgets of China and Russia—their combined 
military expenditures are less than half of the US budget58—the 
United States has the capacity to shift more resources to 
cyberwarfare than its adversaries can. If the United States’ re-
source advantage in overall military expenditures can be repli-
cated and maintained in the cybercontext, the United States 
would presumably want to maximize that advantage rather 
than curtail it. 
 
 52 U.S. Cyber Command (Strategic Command, Mar 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZTB8-EKFV. 
 53 Brian Fung, Cyber Command’s Exploding Budget, in 1 Chart (Wash Post, Jan 15, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/B9X7-M8QF. 
 54 Maggie Ybarra, Cyber Command Investment Ensures Hackers Targeting U.S. 
Face Retribution (Wash Times, Dec 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/72TP-6PVL. 
 55 Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Cyberwarfare Force to Grow Significantly, Defense Secre-
tary Says (Wash Post, Mar 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LSQ8-HRL6. 
 56 Jim Michaels, Pentagon Expands Cyber-Attack Capabilities (USA Today, Apr 21, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/47HN-4LS8. 
 57 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget 
Estimates for FY 2015 *6 (Department of Defense, Apr 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7JV9-ASSU. 
 58 See Richard Norton-Taylor, Eastern Europe Is Boosting Military Budgets, but US 
Is Still the Big Spender (The Guardian, Apr 13, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M6HD-YT6S (“The US defence budget amounted to $610bn (£415bn) last 
year, compared with China’s estimated $216bn and Russia’s estimated $84.5bn.”). 
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Although the United States’ cyberwarfare expenditures are 
growing, it is unclear how the United States’ cybercapacity com-
pares with the cybercapacities of its two largest potential adver-
saries, China and Russia. According to the Cyber Strategy, China 
and Russia are viewed as arguably the United States’ most seri-
ous cybercompetitors.59 Although trees have been felled with 
documentation of Chinese cyberattacks on American compa-
nies,60 only in 2015 did China finally disclose the existence of an 
advanced cyberwar infrastructure that, according to one cyber-
expert, is divided into military, civilian, and external entities, 
each “responsible for targeting American companies to steal 
their secrets.”61 Unsurprisingly, China’s cyberwarfare budget is 
almost impossible to determine, but one estimate suggests that 
China’s budget is “in the billions, nationwide, and certainly in 
the hundreds of millions within the Chinese military.”62 China’s 
overall military budget was estimated to be around $216 billion 
for 2014,63 meaning that it has significant resources to devote to 
cyberoperations if it so chooses. 
Russia, unsurprisingly, poses similar challenges. According 
to a 2010 statement by General Keith Alexander, former direc-
tor of the NSA and head of CYBERCOM, Russia was a “near 
peer” of the United States in cybercapacity, engaging in offen-
sive cyberoperations most recently in Crimea in 2014 and in 
Georgia in 2008.64 Later in 2014, with an initial outlay of $500 
 
 59 The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy at *9 (cited in note 2). See also Franz-
Stefan Gady, Russia Tops China as Principal Cyber Threat to US (The Diplomat, Mar 3, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LXS3-AT4Q; Declan McCullagh, China’s Cyberwar: 
Intrusions Are the New Normal (FAQ) (CNET, Feb 19, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GV5N-9LNX (“The most remarkable aspect of a new and deeply troubling 
report about network intrusions originating in China is how commonplace they’ve be-
come. They’re no longer a rare occurrence: A single Shanghai-based hacking organization 
has reportedly compromised at least 141 companies across 20 industries.”). 
 60 See McCullagh, China’s Cyberwar (cited in note 59); David E. Sanger, David 
Barboza, and Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking against 
U.S. (NY Times, Feb 18, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/TE9W-3JTX: 
A growing body of digital forensic evidence—confirmed by American intelli-
gence officials who say they have tapped into the activity of the [Chinese] army 
unit for years—leaves little doubt that an overwhelming percentage of the at-
tacks on American corporations, organizations and government agencies origi-
nate in and around the white tower. 
 61 Shane Harris, China Reveals Its Cyberwar Secrets (The Daily Beast, Mar 18, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BG42-RMKE. 
 62 Bill Gertz, China Sharply Boosts Cyber Warfare Funding (The Washington Free 
Beacon, Apr 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9UQX-APS4. 
 63 Norton-Taylor, Eastern Europe Is Boosting Military Budgets (cited in note 58). 
 64 Harris, China Reveals Its Cyberwar Secrets (cited in note 61). 
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million, the Russian Ministry of Defense started recruiting 
“young programmers and IT experts” to strengthen cyberwar 
capacity in the Russian army and develop its own cyber-
command.65 In 2015, Director of National Intelligence James 
Clapper testified before Congress that “the Russian cyber threat 
is more severe than we had previously assessed,” and other in-
dependent experts have characterized Russian cyberpower as 
“underestimated.”66 Russia’s military budget for 2014 was ap-
proximately $85 billion67—significantly smaller than the United 
States’ and China’s budgets—but its technological sophistication 
might make up for its shortfall in resources.68 
At bottom, although the United States appears to have a 
more advanced cyberoperation infrastructure (CYBERCOM 
seems to be the model that states are emulating) and greater re-
sources to invest in cyberoperations, it is unclear whether these 
advantages easily translate into a significant advantage in over-
all cyberpower relative to China and Russia. In fact, the concern 
in the United States is that cyberattacks are growing in fre-
quency and creating greater damage, “cost[ing] the U.S. econo-
my as much as $400 billion a year.”69 Admiral Michael Rogers, 
current director of the NSA and CYBERCOM, claims that cyber-
space tensions today resemble superpower tensions at the begin-
ning of the Cold War, suggesting that the United States, China, 
and Russia are aggressively pursuing cyberpower dominance.70 
2. Strategic interests: the United States, China, and 
Russia. 
For the United States, offensive cyberoperations might 
serve as a low-cost complement to more-expensive conventional 
 
 65 Eugene Gerden, $500 Million for New Russian Cyber Army (SC Magazine UK, 
Nov 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N6FE-XD88 (“[T]he Russian government plans 
to accelerate training of programmers, mathematicians, engineers, cryptographer[s], 
communicators[,] interpreters and other staff, who will be asked to sign a contract for 
service in [the] Russian army.”). 
 66 Gady, Russia Tops China as Principal Cyber Threat to US (cited in note 59). 
 67 Norton-Taylor, Eastern Europe Is Boosting Military Budgets (cited in note 58). 
 68 See Gady, Russia Tops China as Principal Cyber Threat to US (cited in note 59) 
(“Russia is singled out as one of the most sophisticated nation-state actors in cyberspace.”). 
 69 Anthony Capaccio and Chris Strohm, Cyberspace Conflict Growing More Destruc-
tive, NSA’s Chief Says (Bloomberg, Mar 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6WMC-LXEX. 
 70 Id (“‘I liken our historical moment to the situation that confronted the U.S. early 
in the Cold War, when it became obvious that the Soviet Union and others could build 
hydrogen bombs and the superpower competition showed worrying signs of instability,’ 
Rogers said in his testimony.”). 
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warfare under certain circumstances.71 At present, a wide range 
of strategic factors requires the United States to project power 
and defend national interests at a global level. These factors in-
clude the breadth of the United States’ treaty obligations and 
political commitments, the rise of China, the threat from states 
like Iran and North Korea, security challenges in the Middle 
East, and Russian aggression on the European periphery. To the 
extent that the United States’ cyberwarfare tools can deter the 
use of military force by its adversaries or simply reduce poten-
tial fatalities for US citizens and foreign civilians, they might 
justify expanding the president’s cyberwar capacity rather than 
restricting it. 
Conversely, the United States also has the most to lose from 
failing to develop a comprehensive cyberstrategy.72 Put bluntly, 
the United States has more public and private sector assets to 
defend than either of its main adversaries. US technology com-
panies,73 large military contractors,74 and financial services 
firms75 are more likely to be the targets of state-sponsored 
cyberattacks—and espionage—than similar companies in China 
 
 71 See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran 
(NY Times, June 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/RYW7-MYBC (“Internal Obama 
administration estimates say the effort was set back by 18 months to two years, but 
some experts inside and outside the government are more skeptical, noting that Iran’s 
enrichment levels have steadily recovered, giving the country enough fuel today for five 
or more weapons, with additional enrichment.”). 
 72 See id: 
In fact, no country’s infrastructure is more dependent on computer systems, 
and thus more vulnerable to attack, than that of the United States. It is only a 
matter of time, most experts believe, before it becomes the target of the same 
kind of weapon that the Americans have used, secretly, against Iran. 
 73 See McCullagh, China’s Cyberwar (cited in note 59): 
Google may have been the first major U.S.-headquartered company to disclose 
the breadth and persistence of attacks originating in China. Intruders man-
aged to compromise the Gmail accounts of human rights workers and foreign 
journalists working in Beijing. Google’s disclosure came in a January 2010 blog 
post, with reports soon following that said Adobe, Yahoo, Juniper Networks, 
Symantec, Northrop Grumman, and Dow Chemical had also been among the 
34 companies targeted. 
 74 See Mike Lennon, Lockheed: Attackers Went Quiet after APT1 Report Exposed 
Chinese Hackers (SecurityWeek, Aug 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JYX6-NKUJ 
(noting that Lockheed executives confirmed that there was an “immediate decrease in 
[cyber] attacks” after the release of a report describing Chinese cyberespionage). 
 75 See Emily Glazer and Danny Yadron, J.P. Morgan Says About 76 Million House-
holds Affected by Cyber Breach (Wall St J, Oct 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZX4Z 
-P5GU (confirming that seventy-six million people had their contact information stolen, “in-
cluding names, email addresses, phone numbers and addresses”). 
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and Russia. For illustrative purposes, one could imagine that a 
serious cyberattack on the United States’ telecommunications or 
banking infrastructure could create significant economic conse-
quences, while a similar cyberattack on North Korea, Iran, or 
even Russia might not be as damaging, even in relative terms. 
Both China and Russia also want to deploy their offensive cy-
bercapabilities in their respective spheres of interest—in China’s 
case, the South China Sea and Taiwan, while in Russia’s case, 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet periphery.76 Similarly, 
China and Russia presumably have interests in continuing to 
engage in cyberespionage to gain access to US technology and 
intellectual property, from both American companies and the US 
government.77 At the same time, China and Russia want to deny 
US offensive cyberoperations against their militaries and other 
targets. Since in theory China and Russia might not have as 
many assets to defend, the United States might be able to con-
centrate its cyberresources on specific targets of value. Finally, 
it is not clear that China or Russia would want to attempt a 
cyberattack that constitutes a use of force (something akin to a 
conventional attack) against the United States, since there is no 
guarantee of success and the likelihood of a cyberresponse is real. 
B. Domestic or International Regulation? 
Although the preceding Section represents a superficial ex-
amination of the cybercapacity and strategic interests of the 
United States, China, and Russia, it does provide some guidance 
on how to think about the merits of both US cyberregulation and 
an international cybertreaty. 
1. US cyberregulation. 
In light of the current threat environment, it appears that 
the United States’ interest is in maximizing its cybercapacity 
and ensuring flexibility to engage in offensive and defensive 
cyberoperations whenever necessary. By most accounts, the 
United States does not have an overall cybercapacity that dra-
matically outstrips its main potential adversaries (China and 
 
 76 See Scott J. Shackelford, Estonia Three Years Later: A Progress Report on Com-
bating Cyber Attacks, 13 J Internet L 22, 24 (Feb 2010). 
 77 See, for example, Hathaway, et al, 100 Cal L Rev at 829 (cited in note 9) (describ-
ing Chinese cyberespionage against Google and “other major Internet technology compa-
nies” that resulted in the theft of intellectual property and raised suspicions that “at 
least one purpose of the attack . . . was to monitor U.S. government officials’ emails”). 
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Russia),78 and the United States has the most cyberassets to de-
fend. Moreover, although the United States is ramping up its 
cybercapacity, China and Russia are doing the same; the United 
States, as Rogers has noted, is in the midst of a cyber–arms 
race.79 To use the illustrative example provided earlier, the 
United States is operating in Model Two80—a world with several 
competing cyberadversaries. In such a world, strong internal 
constraints on the president are inapposite, as the United States 
is already dealing with strong external constraints from China 
and Russia. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that China 
and Russia do not have meaningful internal constraints—that 
is, constraints imposed by law—on their respective capacities to 
exploit public and private sector cyberresources to engage in 
cyberoperations against the United States.81 Overall, the United 
States faces strong external constraints from relatively evenly 
matched adversaries (China and Russia) who are free from do-
mestic constraints (of the legal variety). In this environment, for 
the United States to achieve its cyberpolicy goals, the president 
will likely need more flexibility—or weak internal constraints—
within any cyberregulatory regime. 
2. International cybertreaty. 
Although there exists a well-developed international law 
framework regulating the use of force by states, it is too early to 
tell whether the United States, China, and Russia would truly 
support an international cybertreaty (whatever its details). 
Even beyond the difficulties in defining relevant terms, deter-
mining attribution for cyberattacks, monitoring state behavior, 
and imposing sanctions for violators, the United States, China, 
and Russia might want more time to develop their cybercapaci-
ties—and determine their relative strengths and weaknesses—
before agreeing to a regime that might limit their abilities to ex-
ploit a potential cyberadvantage. If we are indeed at an early 
stage of a cyber “Cold War,” the United States, China, and Russia 
would likely consider an international cybertreaty only after 
 
 78 See Gady, Russia Tops China as Principal Cyber Threat to US (cited in note 59). 
 79 See Cassandra M. Kirsch, Science Fiction No More: Cyber Warfare and the United 
States, 40 Denver J Intl L & Pol 620, 622–23 (2012) (“Politicians and academics alike 
agree that a treaty would lessen the chance of a real cyber war, arguing the world is now 
in the early stages of a Cyber Arms Race.”). 
 80 See Part II.A. 
 81 See Waxman, 36 Yale J Intl L at 456 (cited in note 9). 
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they have developed sufficient cyberdeterrents or, if you will, se-
cond-strike capacities. At that stage, they might feel sufficiently 
secure in their cybercapacities to negotiate a treaty that would 
not only limit offensive cyberattacks but also make it harder for 
other states to develop significant cybercapacities—something 
akin to a cyberversion of a nuclear nonproliferation agreement. 
For now, perhaps the limited bilateral agreement82 between the 
United States and China on restricting state involvement in cy-
bercrime and commercial espionage—concluded in September 
2015—is the best we can do.83 
CONCLUSION 
Considering the strength of external constraints is key to 
understanding how to set internal constraints, both in conven-
tional war and cyberwar. The goal of this Essay is to provide the 
first steps in thinking about the application of a model of exter-
nal constraints in the cybercontext. 
The approach outlined here has two other benefits. First, it 
does not take a position on the content of US cyberpolicy. It simp-
ly suggests that if we want the United States to be successful in 
achieving its cyberprerogatives—whatever they are or should 
be—then determining the appropriate level of cyberregulation 
requires some consideration of external constraints. Second, it 
does not specify the baseline for cyberregulation—it takes no po-
sition on whether we already have too much or too little regula-
tion of the president’s cyberwar authority. Rather, the approach 
says that whatever one thinks the baseline is or should be, the 
strength of external constraints must be part of the analysis. 
 
 82 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis and David E. Sanger, Obama and Xi Jinping of China 
Agree to Steps on Cybertheft (NY Times, Sept 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UQK3 
-QB3M. 
 83 See David E. Sanger, Limiting Security Breaches May Be Impossible Task for 
U.S. and China (NY Times, Sept 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/68UX-EJP4 (sug-
gesting that the United States and China “are still in the beginning phase of a confronta-
tion in cyberspace that will stretch into the next presidency and likely many beyond”). 
